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THE INDIANA TRUST CODE-WHEN TRUST AND CODE
CONFLICT
NICHOLAS L. WHITEt
The Indiana Trust Code, which became effective on September 2,
1971, is a compilation of trust law from numerous sources.1 It applies
only to express personal trusts.2 The Code recodifies, either without
change or with minor changes, many statutes affecting trusts and trust
administration which were previously dispersed throughout the laws con-
cerning probate,' fiduciaries' and real property.' Certain provisions of
the Code are similar to statutes governing such areas as insurance' and
banking.' In addition, the Code adopted provisions of the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act which have not heretofore been enacted in
Indiana.'
Instead of dealing merely with statutory law, the Code also codified,
expressly overruled or clarified much of the existing Indiana case law
relating to trusts. The Code relied heavily upon the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, though in a few provisions the Code expressly
t Assistant Dean and Professor of law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. The history of the Trust Code and of the Indiana Trust Code Study Com-
mission was detailed in an article by Anthony . Ard, Executive Secretary of the
Commission. Ard, A Proposed Trust Code for Indiana-An Effort at Reform, 45
Norm DAmE LAW. 427 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ard]. The article highlights
certain significant changes made in the trust law of Indiana by the Trust Code and
sets forth the principles or themes which guided the commission's deliberations. Id. at
428, 433.
2. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § 1, [1971] Ind. Acts 1911; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1301
(Supp. 1971). Commission comment (c): "The rules of law in this code apply only
to personal trusts. Personal trusts include those which may be created for either
private or charitable purposes:'
3. IND. CODE tit 29 (1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. tits. 6-8 (1953).
4. IND. CODE tit. 30 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 31 (1969). This title included
the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act originally enacted in Indiana in 1969.
IND. CoDE ch. 30-2-3 (1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1101 to -1114 (1969).
5. IND. CODE tit. 32 (1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 56 (1961).
6. IND. CODE § 27-1-12-16 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4210(b) (1965) (life
insurance trusts).
,7. IND. CODE §§ 28-1-5-8, -11-13, -12-1, -2-6-1 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
18-508, -1113, -1201, -1213 (1964). These sections include those providing for the
holding of securities in the name of a nominee and the voting of shares by proxy, a
provision that a bank cannot be compelled to act as trustee and one establishing a
bank's right to compensation as a trustee.
8. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 3(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1919; IND. ANN.
STAT. § 31-1503(a) (Supp. 1971).
9. See comment to Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 7(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1916; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 31-1 4 07(c) (Supp. 1971). Since the Code relies heavily on the Restate-
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differs from the Restatement.' Moreover, the authors of the Code in-
cluded practices, procedures and customs that had arisen in the ad-
ministration of trusts.'"
Because of the comprehensive nature of the Code, it is conceivable
that it could have governed completely the creation and administration of
all express personal trusts. Nevertheless, two guiding themes which
persisted throughout the Commission's labors in drafting the Code
negate such an application. The drafters resolved that the settlor should
have the right to provide the rules for governing his trust" and that the
disposition of trust property, which is primarily family wealth, should
remain a private affair.' The first of these central principles was codified
by the following provision:
The rules of law contained in this article [the Code] shall be
interpreted and applied to the terms of the trust so as to
implement the intent of the settlor and the purposes of the
trust. If the rules of law and terms of the trust conflict, the
terms of the trust shall control unless the rules of law clearly
prohibit or restrict the article which the terms of the trust
purport to authorize.'
While there are many areas of interest in the new Code, this article
will concentrate generally on the effect of the foregoing provision of the
Code and in particular on the problem of when the "unless" clause in the
second sentence is controlling. Therefore, this discussion will attempt
to delineate which terms of a trust will prevail over contrary Code pro-
visions (which are, of course, the "rules of law" mentioned in the
quoted section). This task is unfortunately complicated by the fact that
many of the "rules of law" in the Code impose duties or liabilities on
the trustee rather than explicitly restricting the terms of the trust. Nor
is the Commission comment to the section under consideration particular-
ly helpful.14 In fact, it adds another dimension to the question with its
ment, it should be recognized that the Restatement does not purport to give the law
as it should be but rather as the majority of jurisdictions have held it. Only in situations
in which there is no majority rule does the Restatement include a rule or principle
of trust law which its editors think ought to be adopted. See I A. Scott, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS xii (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ScoTT].
10. Ard, supra note 1, at 432.
11. Id. at 434.
12. Id. at 440.
13. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § 3, [1971] Ind. Acts 1912; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1303
(Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
14. As an aid in interpreting its provisions, the Code provides:
The report of the Trust Code Commission made according to IC 1971, 2-5-11
may be consulted by the courts to determine the reasons, purpose and policies of
this article, and may be used as a guide to its construction and application.
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reference to trust terms which may be "against public policy."
THE PRELIMINARY STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROBLEM
'Many sections of the Code are prefaced by the clause, "unless the
terms of the trust provide otherwise," or words of similar import. These
sections include those governing areas of trust administration where the
courts have consistently upheld the right of the settlor to establish rules
in contravention of common law rules. These areas of administration
include the powers, duties and liabilities of the trustee" and allocation
or apportionment between income and principal."8 The clause also appears
in a few procedural sections covering matters such as venue, court docket-
ing of the trust and bond for the trustee.' Although this clause makes
it clear that the terms of the trust will prevail over the Code, its inclu-
sion in a limited number of sections poses a statutory interpretation
problem as to some sections in which the clause does not appear.
At one extreme is the argument that every section of the Code which
does not specifically permit the terms of the trust to provide otherwise
prohibits any deviation which the terms of the trust might purpoit to
authorize. This position is based on the general rule of statutory con-
struction that the expression of one area of coverage is the exclusion of
another."8 If the legislature had intended to allow terms of the trust to
prevail over certain Code sections, it would have included in those sections
the clause "unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise."
Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § 7 [1971] Ind. Acts 1913; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1307 (Supp.
1971). The comment in question states:
This section retains the prior law that the intent of the settlor as manifested
in the terms of the trust of [sic] conrolling unless it is in violation of some
positive rule of law or against public policy
Comment to Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § 3, [1971] Ind. Acts 1912; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1303 (Supp. 1971) (citations omitted; emphasis added). Of the cases cited in the com-
ment as authority for "the prior law" none involved direct conflict with an established
rule of trust law. Rather, the trusts in question were construed to avoid such conflict.
Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N.E. 324 (1935) (alloca-
tion to principal or income in situation in which settlor did not specifically indicate his.
intent) ; Sellers v. Milford, 101 Ind. App. 590, 198 N.E. 456 (1935) (illegal investment
in situation involving trustee's limited discretionary power) ; Warner v. Keiser, 93 Ind.
App. 547, 177 N.E. 369 (1931) (trust construed so as to avoid violating the Rule Against
Perpetuities) ; McNew v. Vert, 43 Ind. App. 83, 86 N.E. 969 (1909) (trust construed in
accord with purpose and intent of settlor). These cases set forth the general rule in dicta.
15. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, §§ 3, 6(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1919, 1923;.
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-1503, -1506(b) (Supp. 1971).
16. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 1 et seq., [1971] Ind. Acts 1936; IND. AlNN.
STAT. §§ 31-1701 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
,-17. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, §§ 3(a), 4, 8(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1951, 1953;
Im. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-1803(a), -1804, -1808(a) (Supp. 1971).
18. 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION §§ 4915-16 (3d ed.
1943).
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There are at least two reasons for discounting this strict method
of construction. First, such a narrow interpretation would render mean-
ingless the general provision that the terms of the trust shall control
whenever in conflict with a rule of law unless the rule of law clearly
prohibits or restricts the particular trust terms. As a general rule of
statutory construction, a court should adopt an interpretation which, if
possible, gives reasonable meaning and effect to all sections.19 Indeed,
if the legislature had intended such a narrow construction, it would
have provided that, in the event of conflict, the Code will prevail unless
its specific provisions expressly permit the trust to provide otherwise.
Secondly, there are many Code provisions in which the "unless other-
wise provided" clause does not appear and with which the trust terms
might conflict without violating a rule which "clearly prohibits or re-
stricts" the act which the trust terms permit. For example, the code pro-
vides that in the event of disclaimer by a beneficiary, his interest in the
trust estate will be administered as if he had died prior to the effective
date of the trust.2" There seems to be no reason why the settlor should
hot be permitted to make a different disposition of the disclaiming
beneficiary's interest. This section and similar sections of the Code2"
indicate that a trust should be able to provide for a different result even
though the appropriate Code section does not contain an "unless other-
wise provided" clause.
At the other extreme is the interpretation that all sections of the
Code are subject to being overridden by the conflicting terms of a trust.
The obvious fallacy in this interpretation is that the Code includes
certain fundamental rules of law which cannot be ignored without destroy-
ing the entire concept of a trust. The Code provides the method for
creating trusts,22 permits court rescission and reformation of trusts"
and defines the rights of third parties dealing with a trustee.2 For
19. The much-used expressio unius and ejusdem generis rules assume that par-
ticularity is inconsistent with generality, and thus, statutory enumeration re-
stricts judicial application. This is inconsistent with human experience. Nor-
mally when a person particularizes and then generalizes his intent is to include
something more than his particulars; otherwise, he would be making a meaning-
less addition to an already understandable term.
Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 338-39 (1949).
20. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 4, [1971] Ind. Acts 1915; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1404
(Supp. 1971).
21. See notes 186-93 infra & text accompanying.
22. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 1, [1971] Ind. Acts 1913; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1401
(Supp. 1971).
23. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 25, [1971] Ind. Acts 1932; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1525
(Supp. 1971).
24. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 1 et seq., [1971] Ind. Acts 1934; IND. ANN. STAT. §§
31-1601 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
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example, the trust could not excuse the trustee from fulfilling the Code's
requirements that an individual trustee be 21 years of age, of sound
mind and of good moral character25 nor could the trust provide for a
court other than one exercising probate jurisdiction to consider matters
arising under the trust."s
Having found these two extremes of interpretation unreasonable,
there still remains the task of ascertaining which provisions of the Code
will prevail in the event of conflict with the terms of a trust. Considering
the first guiding theme of the Code-the intent of the settlor should be
implemented-it is clear that in the event of conflict the burden must
rest on the party who claims that the Code prevails. Analysis must,
therefore, consist of a review of the provisions of the Trust Code to
determine which provisions may not be overridden by conflicting trust
terms.
TRUST CODE SECTIONS WITH WHICH: TRUST TERMS
CANNOT CONFLICT
A number of Code sections can be eliminated from consideration
since no conflict with trust terms is possible. Such sections include: (1)
those in which the "unless otherwise provided" clause or words of
similar import appear; (2) those which permit a settlor to accomplish
certain goals and to provide for certain methods of administering the
trust; (3) those which pertain to interpreting and construing the Code
itself and (4) those which are fundamental to the creation of an enforce-
able express trust.
Sections in Which the "Unless Otherwise Provided" Clause Appears
The sections of the Code containing this clause appear only in
chapters 3 (rights, powers, duties, liabilities and remedies of parties),7
in 5 (administration) 2" and in 6 (procedure)." In these sections no con-
flict between the trust and the Code is possible.
25. See Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 11, [1971] Ind. Acts 1917; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1411 (Supp. 1971).
26. See Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 1, [1971] Ind. Acts 1951; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1801 (Supp. 1971).
27. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, §§ 1(a), 1(d), 3, 4, 6(b), 7(a), 7(c), 8, 19(a),
20(b); [1971] Ind. Acts 1918-19, 1921, 1923-24, 1929-30; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-1501(a),
-1501(d), -1503, -1504, -1506(b), -1507(a), -1507(c), -1508, -1519(a), -1520(b) (Supp.
1971).
28. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, §2 12(a), 16, [1971] Ind. Acts 1944, 1947; IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 31-1712(a), -1716 (Supp. 1971).
29. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, §§ 3(a), 8(a), 8(d), [1971] Ind. Acts 1951, 1953;
IzD. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-1803(a), -1808(a), -1808(d) (Supp. 1971).
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The sections containing the clause in chapter 3 encompass the
powers, duties and liabilities of the trustee and, to a lesser extent, those
of the settlor and beneficiaries. According to chapter 5, unless the terms
of the trust provide otherwise, the trustee must file an annual written
account with the beneficiaries, and the trustee is entitled to a reasonable
compensation. In addition, all of the provisions in chapter 5 concerning
allocation and apportionment of receipts to or between principal and
income and the provision for charging expenses to principal or income
are subject to the paramount terms of the trust. This follows since these
sections are applicable only "in the absence of any contrary terms of the
trust instrument.""0 As mandated in chapter 6, unless the terms of the
trust provide otherwise, venue for matters arising under the Code lies
exclusively in the county in which the principal place of administration
of the trust is located, no bond is required of a trustee and the court
may require a bond of a court-appointed trustee.
Permissive Sections
Sections which permit a settlor to accomplish certain goals or to
provide for certain methods of administration are dispersed throughout
the Code. Since these provisions are permissive rather than mandatory,
the possibility of conflict between the terms of a trust and the Code is
eliminated. These provisions have, therefore, the same effect as those
containing the clause, "unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise."
The provisions include those permitting a beneficiary and a trustee to
be the same person,"' permitting an unfunded life insurance trust,"-
validating an almost passive "land trust,"33 allowing spendthrift trusts 4
and permitting revocation if the settlor has retained an unrestricted power
to modify the trust.33 The settlor may also provide that the court shall
30. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, §§ 1-11, [19711 Ind. Acts 1936-42; IND. ANN. STAT. §§
31-1701 to -1711 (Supp. 1971). This clause is a parallel formulation of the "unless
otherwise provided" clause.
31. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § l(b), ch. 2, § 11(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1911, 1917;
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-1301(b), -1411(c) (Supp. 1971). Cf. Pub. L. No. 416 ch. 2,
§ 8, [1971] Ind. Acts 1916; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1408 (Supp. 1971) (sole beneficiary
and sole trustee may not be the same person).
32. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 5, [1971] Ind. Acts 1915; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1405
(Supp. 1971).
33. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 13, [1971] Ind. Acts 1917; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1413
(Supp. 1971). See also Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 14, [1971] Ind. Acts 1918; IND. AN N
STAT. § 31-1414 (Supp. 1971) (transfer of beneficial interest in land trust expressly
authorized).
34. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 2(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1919; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1502(a) (Supp. 1971). A spendthrift trust is called a "trust with protective provisions."
35. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § l(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1918; InD. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1501(b) (supp. 1971).
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have continuing jurisdiction over the trust"8 and that the trust shall be
docketed with the court."
A section of the Code similar to the "permissive" sections is that
delimiting the trustee's liability when he follows the instructions of a
third person who has been empowered by the trust to direct him."8
This section by implication permits the settlor to provide for a third
person with such powers. Therefore, the terms of a trust designating
such an advisor or director will not conflict with the provisions of the
Code.
Sections Relating Solely to the Trust Code
Nearly all sections of chapter 1 (general provisions) are aids
in the interpretion and construction of the Code. 9 That chapter also
excludes certain trusts and other relationships or entities from the Code's
provisions 0 and provides for application of the Code to pre-existing
trusts."' Since these provisions concern only the Code and not the sub-
stantive matters of trusts themselves, the terms of a trust could neither
affect nor be in conflict with these provisions.
Similar provisions appear elsewhere in the Code. Except as expressly
provided, the Code is not to be construed to limit the general equity
powers of courts over the administration of trusts.4 There is also the
general provision that jurisdiction lies with the court exercising probate
jurisdiction for "all matters arising under this article."43 No one would
seriously contend that trust terms could dictate which court has juris-
diction over trust matters.
Sections Fundamental to the Application of the Code
Certain sections of the Code are fundamental to the creation and
continued viability of an express trust. If there is no trust, no conflict is
36. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 2, [1971] Ind. Acts 1951; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1802
(Supp. 1971).
37. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 4, [1971] Ind. Acts 1951; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1804
(Supp. 1971).
38. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 9(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1924; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1509(a) (Supp. 1971).
39. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, §§ 1(b), 2-3, 5-7, [1971] Ind. Acts 1911-13; IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 31-1301(b), -1302 to -1303, -1305 to -1307 (Supp. 1971).
40. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § I(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1911; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1301(c) (Supp. 1971).
41. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § 4, [1971] Ind. Acts 1913; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1304
(Supp. 1971).
42. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 30, [1971] Ind. Acts 1934; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1530
(Supp. 1971).
43. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 1, [1971] Ind. Acts 1951; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1801
(Supp. 1971). In the Code, a reference to "this article" means the entire Trust Code.
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possible. If a purported express trust does not meet certain Code require-
ments, no express trust exists. Among the fundamental sections are
that which defines a trust44 and those which require the following: that
the trust be in writing signed by the settlor;45 that the trust's purpose,
property and beneficiaries be identified with reasonable certainty;"8
that the trustee have powers;" that the settlor have capacity48 and that
the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary not be the same person. 9
There are other sections of the Code which are fundamental to the
viability of an express trust or of particular terms. For example, a
trust or section thereof is invalid if it requires the trustee to commit a
criminal or tortious act or an act contrary to public policy.5" It is funda-
mental that the trustee execute and administer the trust in accordance
with its terms.5 To provide otherwise would leave the trustee with no
duties, violating a traditional requirement for a valid trust.2
CODE SECTIONS WHICH SHOULD PREVAIL
OVER CONFLICTING TRUST TERMS
The determination of those Code sections over which the terms of
a trust will prevail in the event of conflict can be made by continuing the
step-by-step analysis of the Code provisions. This analysis will result in
identifying which of the remaining provisions of the Code establish, or
are based upon, rules of law which "clearly prohibit or restrict the article
which the terms of the trust purport to authorize."5 " After this process
of elimination, there remain the sections of the Code over which con-
flicting terms of the trust will prevail. This procedure is warranted for
44. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § 1(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1911; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1301(a) (Supp. 1971).
45. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 1(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1913; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1401(a) (Supp. 1971).
46. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 1(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1914; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1401(b) (Supp. 1971).
47. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 9, [1971] Ind. Acts 1917; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1409
(Supp. 1971).
48. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 10, [1971] Ind. Acts 1917; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1410
(Supp. 1971).
49. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 8, [1971] Ind. Acts 1916; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1408
(Supp. 1971).
50. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 12, [1971] Ind. Acts 1917; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1412
(Supp. 1971).
51. Koehler v. Koehler, 75 Ind. App. 510, 121 N.E. 450 (1919) ; Smith v. Taylor,
34 Ind. App. 194, 72 N.E. 651 (1904). The Code codifies this duty. See Pub. L. No.
416, ch. 3, § 6(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1923; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1506(a) (Supp. 1971).
52. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 9, [1971] Ind. Acts 1917; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1409
(Supp. 1971).
53. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § 3, [1971] Ind. Acts 1912; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1303
(Supp. 1971).
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several reasons. First, since the intent of the settlor as expressed in the
terms of the trust should prevail, the burden lies with those who claim
that provisions of the Code prevail. Second, as a practical matter, all
the provisions of the Code are available for scrutiny, while the terms of
thousands of trusts are not.
In determining whether the terms of the trust or the provisions
of the Code prevail in the event of conflict, the Code provisions should
yield to terms of the trust unless to do so would: (1) violate long-
standing pronouncements of public policy which have been codified in
the Code; (2) impair or jeopardize the trust relation or basic trust admin-
istration; (3) impair or defeat the rights of third parties who are not
settlors, trustees or beneficiaries; or (4) impair or defeat the powers of
the court with jurisdiction over the trust: Although different criteria
might be applied and the lines between these four criteria might not be
altogether distinct, they do provide a meaningful basis for evaluating
the Code provisions for the stated purpose.
Code Provisions Which Uphold Matters of Public Policy
Provisions of the Code which codify matters of public policy
can be categorized as those which restate or assure the duty of loyalty
of the trustee, those which require the trustee to administer the trust in
accordance with its terms, those which protect a beneficiary from a
trustee's abuse of his fiduciary position, those which provide that a
trustee need not act at his peril, those which protect a beneficiary who
is incompetent and those in which the public is a beneficiary.
Whether it is considered a matter of public policy or a fundamental
principle of trust law, the trustee's duty of loyalty is paramount. As
Professor Scott states:
The most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the
beneficiaries of the trust is the duty of loyalty. This duty is
imposed upon the trustee not because of any provision in the
terms of the trust but because of the relationship which arises
from the creation of the trust. . . In some relations the fidu-
ciary element is more intense than in others; it is peculiarly
intense in the case of a trust.5"
Thus, those sections of the Code which tend to uphold and assure this
duty of loyalty should prevail in the event of conflict with terms of the
trust. Further support for this contention can be drawn from the long-
54. H ScoTt, supra note 9, § 170.
489
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standing position of the courts with respect to exculpatory clauses re-
lieving a trustee from liability for breach of trust. Courts have con-
strued such clauses narrowly and have found liability for acts of bad
faith or wilful breach regardless of such clauses."
One section of the Code upholding the trustee's duty of loyalty
provides that, if the duty of the trustee in the exercise of any power
conflicts with his individual interest or his interest as trustee of another
trust, the power may be exercised only with court authorization."0 This
section applies even if the settlor has empowered his trustee to deal with
himself, since this section is only applicable when the trustee has such a
power. Indeed, the trustee can only have the power to deal with himself
if authorized by the terms of the trust." Court authorization assures
that the duty of loyalty will be observed even when the trustee is given
the right of self-dealing."
It is less clear whether court authorization is needed to safeguard the
duty of loyalty of a trustee who administers several trusts and deals
between them. The Code expressly permits dealing between trusts when
it is fair and reasonable to all beneficiaries and complete disclosure
is made to the beneficiaries of both trusts.59 Since no personal gain for the
trustee is involved, a majority of courts have held that transactions
between trusts cannot be set aside if fair to both trusts.6" It would appear,
therefore, that when the trustee abides by the Code section permitting
intertrust dealing, court authorization is not necessary. The trustee should
not, however, be able to dispense with the requirement of disclosure to
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
No matter how broad the provision may be, the trustee is liable if he com-
mits a breach of trust in bad faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference
to the interests of the beneficiaries, or if he has personally profited through a
breach of trust.
III SCOTT, supra note 9, § 222.3, at 1777; see also Annot., 158 A.L.R. 276, 285 (1945).
56. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 5, [1971] Ind. Acts 1922; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1505
(Supp. 1971).
57. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 7(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1923, IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
15 07(a) (Supp. 1971) : "Unless the terms of the trust prozide otherwtise, the trustee has
a duty: (1) not to loan funds to himself or an affiliate. . . (emphasis added)."
58. Examples of self-dealing include a trustee buying from or selling to the trust,
a corporate trustee investing in shares of its own stock, a trustee taking a bonus or com-
mission on sales to the trust or competing in business with the trust and almost any other
situation in which the trustee's personal interest might conflict with his fiduciary duties.
See The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty. 6 REAL PROP., PROD. & TRUST J. 528, 530 (1971)
(situations held to constitute self-dealing).
59. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 7(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1924; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1507(c) (Supp. 1971).
60. See II SCOTT, supra note 9, § 170.16; Annot., 129 A.L.R. 150 (1940). But see
UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 6.
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all beneficiaries, since this is the crucial safeguard against breaches of
the duty of loyalty.
In this same area of loyalty, the Code provides that a trustee who
is permitted for his own personal benefit to deal with a beneficiary must
deal fairly and make a complete disclosure to the beneficiary.6 To permit
the terms of a trust to authorize such dealing without these safeguards
would be in derogation of long established trust law.62 Without this duty
of fairness and the requirement of complete disclosure there would be
little or no deterrent to the trustee who is in a position to take advantage
of the beneficiary. The trust terms should not, as a result, prevail in the
event of conflict with these requirements of the Code.
Those Code provisions which attempt to assure that the trustee
abides by his duty of loyalty should also prevail in the event of conflict
with terms of the trust. One such "assurance" provision is that which
permits the court, in its discretion, to deny a trustee compensation when
he has breached trust obligations.6" Professor Bogert states:
The [fee] is allotted for an execution of the trust with
the highest degree of good faith and with ordinary skill and
care.
64
The general rule that the court may disallow all or part of a trustee's
fees for breach of trust is long-standing and widely followed.6" When
the breach involves the duty of loyalty, the courts have uniformly held
that the trustee is not entitled to compensation.66
A similar provision assuring loyalty is that which permits the
settlor, a beneficiary or any person having an interest in the administra-
tion or benefits of the trust to petition the court to require the trustee
to file a verified written statement of account with the court.6 In this
61. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 7(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1924; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1507(b) (Supp. 1971).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170, comment w (1959). See Troyak v.
Enos, 204 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1953); Whitesell v. Strickler, 167 Ind. 602, 78 N.E. 845
(1906); Schemmel v. Hill, 91 Ind. App. 373, 169 N.E. 678 (1930).
63. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 17, [1971] Ind. Acts 1947; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1717
(Supp. 1971). In the exercise of its discretion, the court may consider whether the trus-
tee acted in good faith and whether the breach was intentional.
64. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 980, at 404 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited
as BOGERT].
65. Id.; III SCOTT, supra note 9, § 243.
66. Annot., 110 A.L.R. 573 (1937).
67. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 12(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1712(c) (Supp. 1971). It should be noted that this subsection does not expressly state
that such verified written statement of accounts shall be filed with the court. It is im-
plied, however, when considered in the context of other parts of the Code. When re-
ferring to accounts to be delivered to beneficiaries, the Code refers to them as "written
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manner the beneficiary can ascertain whether the estate is being admin-
istered properly and can invoke the assistance of the court to require
the trustee to redress any breach. Without this right, a beneficiary would
either be unable to enforce the trust for his benefit or be delayed to
the extent that his beneficial interest could be seriously jeopardized.
There are areas other than the duty of loyalty in which public policy
should be considered in analyzing Code provisions to ascertain whether
they prevail in the event of conflict with terms of the trust. It has long
been established that a person should not be required to act at his peril,
particularly a trustee in the administration of his trust." In Messner v.
DeMotte,6" the Indiana Appellate Court stated:
A trustee need not act at his peril. He may under appro-
priate circumstances apply to the court for advice and instruc-
tions, and obtain from the court a construction of the trust
instrument. Such right he has both in equity and by enact-
ment in this state.0
In addition, Indiana's Declaratory Judgment Act7' provides that a
trustee may have a declaration of rights or legal relations with respect
to administration of a trust.72 The codification 71 of this long-standing
right of a trustee to apply to the court for instructions when reasonably in
doubt clearly demonstrates that the terms of the trust cannot deny a
trustee the right.
A similar Code provision provides that the trustee is entitled to
review and settlement by the court of the accounts of his administra-
tion.74 If the trust does not provide for continuing jurisdiction by the
court or if the trust is not a trust for benevolent public purposes, the
statement[s] of accounts." Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 12(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1944;
IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1712(a) (Supp. 1971). When referring to accounts to be filed
with the court, the Code refers to them as "verified written statement[s] of accounts."
Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, §§ 12(d), 13(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-
1712(a), -1713(a) (Supp. 1971).
68. A trustee is not compelled to act at his peril in the administration of the
trust. He need not act first and discover later whether his act was in breach
of trust.
III ScoTt, supra note 9, § 259, at 2214.
69. 119 Ind. App. 273, 82 N.E.2d 900 (1948).
70. Id. at 281, 82 N.E.2d at 903; accord, Gibault Home for Boys v. Terre Haute
First Nat'l Bank, 227 Ind. 410, 85 N.E.2d 824 (1949).
71. IND. CODE ch. 34-4-10 (1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1101 et seq. (1968).
72. IND. CODE § 34-4-10-4 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1104 (1968).
73. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 18(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1928; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1518(a) (Supp. 1971).
74. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 18(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1928; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1518(b) (Supp. 1971).
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trustee has no duty to file an account with the court."' It would appear,
therefore, that the rights of court review and account settlement may be
invoked by the trustee for protection in situations in which he is not
required to file an account with the court. To permit a trust to deprive
the trustee of this right would possibly subject him to prolonged harass-
ment by disgruntled beneficiaries. Therefore, notwithstanding trust terms
to the contrary, a trustee should have the right to have a dispute settled
by a court just as the beneficiary has a right to require an accounting."
The Code provides that by certain acts such as participation, con-
sent or release a beneficiary may relieve a trustee from liability for
breach of trust.77 Such relief is not effective, however, if the beneficiary
was under an incapacity, was not informed of material facts which the
trustee knew or was induced by the trustee's improper conduct or if the
trustee had an adverse interest in an unfair and unreasonable trans-
action. In such cases the trustee's duty of loyalty to the beneficiary is
violated. Because this duty is fundamental to the trust relationship, terms
of the trust contrary to these limitation provisions should not prevail in
the event of conflict.
When the public is involved, the trust by its terms should not be
able to detract from the public's right to enforce its interests. Thus, in
the case of a trust for benevolent public purposes, the provision of the
Code for an accounting by the trustee to the court is mandatory. This
accounting forms the basis upon which the benefited public gains know-
ledge of the trust's administration. To permit trust terms to dispense
with such an accounting or any of the substantive content required by
the Code"0 would permit the trustee to shield his actions from public
75. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, §§ 12(b), (d), [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; INn. ANN. STAT.
88 31-1712(b), (d) (Supp. 1971).
76. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 12(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; IND. ANN. STAT. 8 31-
1712(c) (Supp. 1971).
77. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 19(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1929; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1519(a) (Supp. 1971).
78. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 19(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1929; IND. ANN. STAT. 8 31-
1519(b) (Supp. 1971).
79. "[T]he trustee shall file a verified written statement annually with the court.'
Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 12(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1712(b)
(Supp. 1971) (emphasis added). The enactment of the Code repealed the prior statutes
requiring an annual accounting with the circuit court in the case of public charitable
trusts. INn. CODE §§ 30-2-2-1, -2 (1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-712, -713 (1969) (re-
pealed 1971). In Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, 101 N.E. 493 (1913), an early
Indiana case construing the prior statutes, the supreme court held that terms of a testa-
mentary charitable trust providing for no accounting would yield to the statute requiring
accounting to the court.
80. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 13, [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1713
(Supp. 1971).
493
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
scrutiny. To assure that the accounting requirement is met, the Code
provides that in the case of a trust for public benevolent purposes, a
court upon petition by the attorney general has the power to direct a
trustee to file a verified written statement of account." To permit the
trust by its terms to eliminate or detract from this right would, in effect,
permit the settlor to prevent the attorney general from thus protecting
the public interest.
Code Provisions Which Protect the Trust Relationship
When a settlor's intent to create a trust is clear, terms of the trust
which would inadvertently defeat or impair the intended trust should
not prevail over the Code in the event of conflict. An example of the
problem posed by this type of conflict is provided by the Code provision
that "the trustee takes title to the trust property."8 Since the definition
of a valid trust requires that the trustee take title to the trust property,83
a contrary trust provision cannot be effective.84 The same rationale applies
to the provision of the Code which states that the beneficiary takes an
equitable interest in the trust property.85
Less apparent problems arise when the terms of the trust impose
restrictions on the rights and powers of beneficiary or trustee in conflict
with those set forth in the Code. For example, does a beneficiary have an
interest (property right) in the trust if he cannot legally enforce it
because of restrictions imposed upon him by the terms of the trust? In
order to have a right or interest in anything, it must be enforceable by
law. 6 As a result, terms of a trust which eliminate the power of a bene-
ficiary to enforce his rights could effectively eliminate the interest of
the beneficiary and thus destroy or greatly impair the trust.8 7
81. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 12(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1712(c) (Supp. 1971).
82. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 6(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1916; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1406(a) (Supp. 1971).
83. A trust is a fiduciary relationship between a person who, as trustee, holds
title to property and another person for whom, as beneficiary, the title is held.
Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § l(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1911; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1301(a)
(Supp. 1971).
84. This conclusion is ,of course, based on the premise that the settlor intends to
create a trust. It is possible that the terms of the writing are such that no trust is cre-
ated, in which event the Code does not apply and no conflict is possible.
85. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 7(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1916; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1407(a) (Supp. 1971).
86. In re Gogabashvele's Estate, 195 Cal. App.2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961) ; Bailey v. Miller, 45 Ind. App. 475, 91 N.E. 24 (1910) ; Schmitt v. Jenkins
Truck Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556, 149 N.W.2d 789 (1967). See also RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 1 (1936) ; Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919).
87. This situation is, of course, distinguishable from those caused by a statute of
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This right of the beneficiary to enforce the trust is fundamental
whether his interest is deemed one in property (proprietary) or merely
a right enforce the trust against the trustee. Professor Scott states:
[W]hen property is transferred by one person to another
to the use of or in trust for a third person, there is not and there
never has been any doubt of the right of that third person to
enforce the use or trust .... "
Professor Bogert, while recognizing the trend toward considering the
beneficiary's interest proprietary, states:
The nature of the beneficiary's rights would seem to be
summarized by the statement that while the right of the bene-
ficiary originally was solely in personam against the trustee,
it has increasingly become a right in rem and is now sub-
stantially equivalent to equitable ownership of the trust res.
The beneficiary, of course, also has rights in personam against
the trustee.8"
Finally, the comments to the Code describe the beneficiary's equitable
interest as being his right to enforce the trust." The public policy of
Indiana appears to protect the power of a person to pursue his rights in
such cases. In an analogous situation under the Probate Code, it is
provided that a provision of a will is void if it specifies that any bene-
ficiary who contests the will shall forfeit his benefits under it."'
Some Trust Code provisions confer duties on the trustee which
give rise to implied rights in the beneficiary. These rights are essential
if the beneficiary is to enforce the trust effectively. One such provision
makes the trustee accountable to the beneficiary for the trust estate.92
Being "accountable to the beneficiary" does not mean merely furnish-
ing a statement of accounts but also encompasses liability to the bene-
ficiary for the care and control of the trust property, including both
limitations which removes the power to enforce a right because of the passage of time
or a statute of frauds which renders a right unenforceable because the promise on which
it is based is not in writing.
88. Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 CoLum. L. REv.
269, 270 (1917) [hereinafter cited as Nature of Rights].
89. BOGERT, supra note 64, § 183, at 262-64.
90. Comment to Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 7, [1917] Ind. Acts 1916; IND. ANN. STAT.§ 31-1407 (Supp. 1971).
91. IND. CODE § 29-1-6-2 (1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-602 (1953). See Kenner,
Noncontesting Clauses in Wills, 3 IND. L.J. 269 (1928).
92. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 11(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1926; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1511(a) (Supp. 1971).
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the trust principal and earned income.9" To permit the trust terms to
negate this duty of accountability would effectively prevent the bene-
ficiary from enforcing his right to hold the trustee liable for adminis-
tration of the trust. Since the right of the beneficiary to enforce the
trust cannot be eliminated by the terms of the trust, neither can the
duty upon which it rests.
In other instances the Code expressly provides the beneficiary
with remedies to enforce his rights under the terms of the trust. These
remedies lie against the trustee,94 third parties95 and cobeneficiaries.9"
The remedies against the trustee may be invoked both to recover trust
property if the trustee breaches the trust and to prevent the trustee
from breaching the trust. The remedies against a cobeneficiary are avail-
able when no recovery can be had against the trustee with whom the
cobeneficiary participated in a breach of trust. The remedies against
third persons are available when the trustee has a claim against a third
person but refuses or neglects to pursue it. In each situation, if the
beneficiary is prevented by the terms of the trust from pursuing these
remedies, his rights may be effectively negated and his interest in the
trust lost. Such terms should not, therefore, prevail over Code provisions
which empower the beneficiary to enforce his rights.
The beneficiary's rights to pursue a third party directly are a depar-
ture from the common law which held that the trustee, and not the
beneficiary, must maintain the action.97 The common law developed,
however, to permit a beneficiary to pursue the third party as a code-
fendant with the trustee when the trustee refused or was unable to act.9"
The Code eliminates the necessity of joining the trustee as a codefendant
but requires the plaintiff beneficiary to sue for the benefit of all bene-
ficiaries.99 Since the beneficiary's rights against a third party are not
93. See Rock Island Auction Sales, Inc. v. Empire Packing Co., 32 Ill.2d 269, 204
N.E.2d 721 (1965) ; Sullivan v. Carmany, 384 Pa. 486, 121 A.2d 174 (1956).
94. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 22, [1971] Ind. Acts 1930; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1522
(Supp. 1971).
95. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 21, [1971] Ind. Acts 1930; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1521
(Supp. 1971).
96. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 23, [1971] Ind. Acts 1931; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1523
(Supp. 1971).
97. Even in the modern law, however, the beneficiaries' interest is protected
through proceedings brought by the trustee. . . . The beneficiaries therefore
have no direct claim against the tortfeasor, but must work out their rights
through the trustee.
IV ScoTT, supra note 9, § 282, at 2337.
98. Id., § 282.1. See Wright v. Mack, 95 Ind. 332 (1883). Cf. Voorhees v. Car-
penter, 127 Ind. 300, 26 N.E. 838 (1890).
99. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 21, [1971] Ind. Acts 1930; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1521
(Supp. 1971).
INDIANA TRUST CODE
impaired if the trust requires the trustee to be joined as a codefendant,
the terms of a trust should prevail in the event of a conflict with the
Code. On the other hand, the trust by its terms should not be able to
permit a single beneficiary to recover for only his interest when there
are several beneficiaries. To permit this latter situation would unneces-
sarily open the door to a multiplicity of suits on separate claims.
This brief analysis of the one section of the Code that deals with
the remedies of the beneficiary against third persons is indicative of the
problems faced when attempting to decide whether particular Code
sections should prevail in the event of conflict with terms of the trust.
While the basic rights of the beneficiary against third persons provided
in the Code should not be impaired, the procedure for pursuing these
rights could yield to conflicting terms of a trust without impairing the
beneficiary's interests.
A similar analysis can be made of the Code provision which sets
forth a beneficiary's remedies against a cobeneficiary who participates
in, or consents to, a breach of trust by the trustee..0 and the provision
which states that a trustee, by certain acts or failures to act, is liable to the
beneficiary for breach by a cotrustee.'0 This latter provision would not
apply to the trustee who, by the terms of the trust, had limited duties not
related to the breach by his cotrustee or had no duties to supervise or
participate with his cotrustee in the administration of the trust.0 2
In addition to providing remedies for the beneficiary, the Code
provides rights and remedies for the trustee against beneficiaries,' 3
cotrusteese" and third parties.' The trustee may recover for losses
occasioned by a beneficiary's misappropriation of trust property, a
100. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 23, [1971] Ind. Acts 1931; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1523
(Supp. 1971).
101. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 12, [1971] Ind. Acts 1927; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1512 (Supp. 1971).
102. Many instruments which are drawn with the advice of corporate trustees
and which provide for a co-trusteeship in which a trust institution is to be joined
with one or more individuals contain a clause to the effect that custody of the
trust property shall be vested in the corporate trustee and sometimes that other
functions shall be exercised by it exclusively. If the settlor is willing to accept
these terms, it would seem that they should be enforced, since they do not appear
to violate any principle of public policy, unless they deprive the individual
trustees of all powers.
BoGmT, supra note 64, § 590, at 256.
103. Pub. L. No. 416, ck 3, §§ 17, 20(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1928, 1930; IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 31-1517, -1520(a) (Supp. 1971).
104. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, §§ 14, 16, [1971] Ind. Acts 1927, 1928; IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 31-1514, -1516 (Supp. 1971).
105. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 15, [1971] Ind. Acts 1928; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1515 (Supp. 1971).
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beneficiary's failure to repay a loan or advance and a beneficiary's breach
of a contract to deliver property or pay money to the trust estate. As to
cotrustees, the trustee can seek to enjoin a threatened breach of trust and
compel redress if a breach occurs. The trustee is also entitled to contri-
butions from, or indemnification by, the cotrustee if the latter was at fault.
With respect to third parties, the trustee may maintain any action which
he could maintain on his own right if he were the owner. These rights are
necessary if a trustee is to preserve the trust estate"8 and enforce claims
on behalf of the trust.
The basic duty of the trustee to enforce claims has likewise been
codified." 7 If the trustee has no powers to enforce claims on behalf of
the trust in these situations, the result might be the loss by the
trustee of all interest in the trust property. This would, of course, destroy
the trust."0 '
Other provisions of the Code protect the trust estate from third-
party claims not arising in the administration of the trust. The most
obviously important is the section directing that a judgment against
a trustee individually not be a lien upon the trust estate.0 9 If the trust
instrument provides otherwise, the trust estate could be dissipated to
the personal benefit of the trustee. Not only would this appear to
violate the trustee's duty of loyalty, but it could destroy the trust by
destroying the trust estate.
While the trust estate is not subject to claims against the trustee
individually, the interest of the beneficiary is subject to the claims of the
beneficiary's creditors unless valid "protective provisions" are set forth in
the trust."' The Trust Code does provide, however, that when the trust
106. The obligation to preserve the trust estate is set forth in the Code. Pub. L.
No. 416, ch. 3, § 6(b) (4), [1971] Ind. Acts 1923; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1506(b) (4)
(Supp. 1971). This has been recognized as one of the basic duties of a trustee:
The trustee has a duty to protect the trust property against injury or de-
struction. He is obligated to the cestui to do all acts necessary for he preservation
of the trust res which would be performed by a reasonably prudent man employ-
ing his own like property for ends similar to those of the trust.
BOGERT. supra note 64, § 582, at 216.
107. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 6(b) (9), [1971] Ind. Acts 1923, INDi. ANN. STAT. §
31-1506(b) (9) (Supp. 1971).
108. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 1, § l(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1911; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1301(a) (Supp. 1971).
The duties of the trustee almost universally require him to take into his
possession tangible realty or personalty, and to reduce choses in action to pos-
session. This duty of obtaining physical dominion over the trust estate and the
documents representing it is a primary obligation of the trustee toward the cestui.
BOGERT, stpra note 64, § 583, at 279.
109. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 3(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1935; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1603(a) (Supp. 1971).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 147 (1959). See IND. CODE § 34-1-45-1
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property is properly sold, the liens against a beneficiary's interest in the
trust estate shift from the trust property to the proceeds."' 1 The purpose
of this provision is to assure free alienability of the trust property by
the trustee. 2 While it would not destroy the trust to permit a lien to
follow the property rather than the proceeds, it would certainly impair
the trustee's powers to deal with the trust estate for the best interests
of the beneficiaries. If the settlor makes it clear that the trust property
is subject to lien claims by the beneficiary's creditors, the beneficiary
should not be heard to complain. A problem could arise, however, with
those who deal with the trustee in reliance on the alienability of the
trust property. Although liens are generally recorded under the names
of the debtor-in this case, the name of the beneficiary-the title to the
property would be in the name of the trustee. Therefore, in order to protect
third parties dealing with the trustee, the Code should prevail over
conflicting terms of the trust. This is a situation in which the terms of the
trust should prevail if only the beneficiary's lien claimant and the trustee
are involved but in which the Code should prevail if third-party bona
fide purchasers without notice of the trust terms are concerned.
The Code provisions discussed in this section should be distin-
guished from provisions such as that which states that the trustee,
absent a breach of trust, has no liability to the beneficiary either for
any loss or depreciation in value of the trust property or for a failure
to make profit."1 3 If the terms of the trust provide that the trustee is
liable for losses irrespective of breach of trust or that the trustee, with
no power to distribute trust corpus, must pay a certain amount to the
beneficiary, the relationship may be deemed an equitable charge 4 or
(1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3613 (1968) :
The following real estate shall be liable to all judgments and attachments,
and to be sold on execution against the debtor owning the same, or for whose
use the same is holden, viz.:
Fourth Lands, or any estate, or interest therein, holden by any one in trust
for, or to the use of another.
See also Maxwell v. Vaught, 96 Ind. 136 (1884) ; Cox v. Arnsmann, 76 Ind. 210 (1881).
111. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 3(b), [19711 Ind. Acts 1935; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1603(b) (Supp. 1971).
112. Comment to Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 3(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1935; IND. ANN.
STAT. § 31-1603(b) (Supp. 1971): "The purpose of this subsection is to assure that
trust property will be freely transferable irrespective of any beneficiary's status as a
debtor."
113. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 11(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1926; IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-
1511(c) (Supp. 1971).
114. Ordinarily where property is transferred to another "subject to the pay-
ment of" a certain sum to a third person, or "paying" such a sum, an equitable
charge and not a trust is created, since the transferor does not thereby manifest
an intention to impose a duty upon the transferee to deal with the property for
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a contract 15 entered into between the trustee and the settlor."' It is,
of course, the intent of the settlor that controls, and it may be his intent
that a contract or an equitable charge be created. In either case a relation-
ship other than a trust exists, and the Code does not apply. This Code
provision could be considered as part of, or similar to, those which are
deemed fundamental to the application of the Code."1 7
Code Provisions Which Protect the Rights of Third Persons
In any situation in which the provisions of the Code protect the
rights of third persons, the terms of the trust should not prevail in the
event of conflict. The reasons for this are quite apparent. Initially, the
third person is or should be aware of the Code provisions, since they are
a matter of statutory law, but he is not necessarily aware of the terms
of the trust or even of its existence. Therefore, third parties should
be allowed to rely upon Code provisions for the policy reasons of con-
venience and certainty. Second, the third person is not a party to the
trust-he did not participate in its formulation as did the settlor and
trustee, nor does he benefit from the trust as does a beneficiary. Thus,
there is no reason based on contractual policy which would justify
allowing the settlor to abrogate the rights of third parties. Third, if
trust terms could negate the protection provided third persons, the Code
policy promoting the alienability of trust property would be defeated,
the benefit of the third person. On the other hand, where property is trans-
ferred to another with a direction to pay to a third person a certain sum out of
the property or its proceeds, or "subject to the payment from the property or its
proceeds," or "paying from the property or its proceeds" such sums, a trust
and not an equitable charge is created, since the transferor thereby manifests an
intention to impose a duty upon the transferee to deal with the property in part
at least for the benefit of the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 10, comment b (1959).
115. A trust is to be distinguished from a contract for the benefit of a third
party. Whether there is a trust or merely a contract for the benefit of a third
party depends upon whether there is property held by one person for the bene-
fit of the third party, or merely a personal undertaking to make payment to
the third party.
I SCOTT, supra note 9, § 14, at 141-42.
116. In connection with the creation of a trust the trustee may of course enter
into a contract with the settlor. He may agree to do something other than
merely to perform his duties as trustee. Thus he may agree with the settlor
that if the trust property should be lost even without his fault he would make
good the loss. In such a case if he fails to carry out his promise an action at
law for breach of contract can be maintained against him by the settlor, or if
the contract was made for the benefit of the cestui que trust, then the latter can
maintain an action at law as beneficiary of the conract in jurisdictions in which
third-party beneficiaries are entitled to maintain an action.
III id., § 197.2, at 1624.
117. See notes 44-52 supra & text accompanying.
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since third parties would be deterred from dealing with the trustee.
Finally, statutes with effects similar to the Code provisions protecting
the rights of third persons have been upheld.'18
Working from the premise that trust terms should not prevail when
in conflict with Code provisions protecting the rights of third persons,
the Code can be reviewed to determine which of its provisions afford
such protection to third persons either dealing with or coming into con-
tact with the trustee or trust property. These provisions fall into two
general categories, those which expressly affect third persons and those
which impliedly or indirectly affect them. The provisions which ex-
pressly affect third persons may be divided into two subcategories, those
in which the third person voluntarily deals with the trustee or trust pro-
perty and those in which the third person's contact is involuntary.
In chapter 4 of the Trust Code, express rules governing the rights
of third persons are set forth. The first of these rules allows a third
person dealing with a trustee, without actual knowledge of the trustee's
limited powers, to assume without inquiry that the trustee has the powers
that he purports to exercise. This section further provides that the third
person is not responsible for application of the payment made to the
trustee." 9 The second of these express rules provides that the third-
person transferee takes title to the trust property free of trust when the
transfer is not made in breach of trust and, even when made in breach
of trust, if he takes for value, without notice of the breach and without
knowledge that it is part of an illegal transaction.' These two provisions
of the Code, when construed together, include in the class of protected
bona fide purchasers those third persons who have notice of the trust,
118. For example, transfer agents for corporations (third persons) can, pursuant
to the Uniform Commercial Code, transfer stock in the name of a fiduciary without in-
quiry as to the fiduciary's powers. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-403(3) (b); IND.
CODE § 26-1-8403 (1971); Im). ANN. STAT. § 19-8-403 (1964); Cf. UNIFORM FIDUCI-
ARIES ACT § 3; IND. CODE § 30-2-4-3 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-103 (1969) (repealed
1964, to the extent inconsistent with Uniform Commercial Code). See also UNIFORM AcT
FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS; IND. CODE § 30-2-5-1
et seq. (1971) ; Im. ANN. STAT. § 31-901 et seq. (1969). The comment to ch. 4, § 1 of
the Trust Code notes that it is not to be construed to be in conflict with this Uniform
Act. Comment to Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 1, [1971] Ind. Acts 1934; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1601 (Supp. 1971).
119. Pub. L. No. 416 ch. 4, § 1(a) (2) [1971] Ind. Acts 1934; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1601 (a) (2) (Supp. 1971). It should be borne in mind, nevertheless, that the third
person who has actual knowledge of the terms of the trust, or who deals with trust real
estate in a county in which the trust is of public record, may not assume that the trustee
has authority or power to deal with the trust property. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, §§ 1 (b) -
(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1934-35; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-1601(b)-(c) (Supp. 1971).
120. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 2, [1971] Ind. Acts 1935, IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1602
(Supp. 1971).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
but who do not make inquiry as to the trustee's powers to deal with the
trust property. Only those third persons who have actual knowledge
either of the terms of the trust or that the transaction is in breach of trust
take the trust property subject to the trust. The prior Indiana statutes
and the common law rule protected only the third person who was
unaware that he was dealing with a trust or trustee.' 2' If the third
person knew that he was dealing with a trustee, he was bound to make
inquiry of the authority of the trustee to make the transfer. The Code
clearly favors stronger protection for third parties dealing with trustees
than did prior law.
The Code expressly provides that the trustee is not personally liable
to a third person on any contract or nonnegotiable instrument made in
the administration of the trust unless the contract expressly provides
otherwise. 2' The effect of this provision is that, irrespective of the terms
of the trust, unless the contract provides otherwise, the third person has
a claim against the trust to enforce the contract or a claim for damages
against the trust in the event of breach of the contract. This is not con-
trary to the modem trend of decisions recognizing a third person's right
to proceed against the trust estate in situations in which the contract is
not in breach of trust."' The Code provisions do, however, represent a
probable extension of this trend by protecting third parties in situations
in which the contract is in breach of trust but the third person is unaware
of the terms of the trust or the fact of the breach. Since a third person
can assume without inquiry that the trustee is acting within the scope
of his authority, this extension is consistent with other provisions of
the Code.
In a situation involving a third party's claim for injuries arising
from the administration of a trust, the third party deals involuntarily
with the trustee and the trust estate. The Code expressly designates
the assets against which the third party may proceed-the trustee's
individual property or the trust estate-and the order in which satis-
121 IND. CODE 30-1-9-2 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-602 (1961) (repealed 1971);
Pillars v. McConnell, 141 Ind. 670, 40 N.E. 689 (1895) ; Ray v. Ferrell, 127 Ind. 570,
27 N.E. 159 (1891) ; Parmlee v. Sloan, 37 Ind. 469 (1871). See also IV ScoTT, srupra
note 9, § 284, at 2342; Nature of Rights, supra note 88, at 278.
122. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 10(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1925; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31- 1510(a) (Supp. 1971).
123. The notion underlying this view is that the trustee is the manager of
the trust estate and that his acts properly performed in the management
of the estate create liabilities enforceable against the estate. There is a
certain analogy to the doctrines of agency. The difference is that an agent
binds his principal personally, whereas a trustee cannot bind the benefici-
aries personally, but can only bind the trust estate.
III ScoTT, supra note 9, § 271A.1, at 2289-90.
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faction can be had from such assets." 4 The ultimate liability as between
the trustee and the trust estate can be provided in the trust, but the
rights of injured third persons to proceed against the trustee's individual
property or the trust estate should not be changed or taken away by the
terms of the trust. This situation is analogous to liability under the
master-servant relationship. Irrespective of what the employment agree-
ment may provide, the master is liable to an injured third party if the
servant was acting within the scope of his authority.'25
In other situations the Code provisions indirectly or impliedly affect
third persons. For example, a trustee is presumed to have accepted his
trusteeship if he exercises powers or performs duties under the trust.'26
The trust instrument could provide that acceptance by the trustee must
be accomplished by a formal written document. This requirement, how-
ever, should not adversely affect the rights of third persons who deal
in good faith with the "acting trustee." As noted earlier, a third person
dealing with the trustee may presume that the trustee has acted with
authority to do so. The third person should be able to deal with assur-
ance when the trustee exercises power and performs duties under the
trust.
A similar Code provision provides that acceptance of a trust by a
beneficiary is presumed. If he intends to disclaim, the beneficiary must
do so within a reasonable time (not to exceed three months) after he
has received written notice of his interest and after his interest has been
indefeasibly fixed as to both quality and quantity.'27 After expiration
of the disclaimer period, the rights of third-party creditors, or of other
parties dealing with the beneficiary, should not be adversely affected
by any terms of the trust extending the time for disclaimer or dispensing
with the presumption of acceptance. Analogous support for the concept of
protecting third-person creditors of beneficiaries regardless of trust terms
has already been established in Indiana law. Since 1953 the Probate
Code has provided that, in the case of testamentary gifts, creditors of a
beneficiary may object to the beneficiary's renunciation. In such situa-
tions, the court can declare the renunciation ineffective if it finds that
124. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3 ,§ 10(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1925; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1510(b) (Supp. 1971).
125. W. PRossER, TaE LAw or ToRTs, § 70, at 460, 461 (4th ed. 1971).
126. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 2(b) [1971] Ind. Acts 1914; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1402(b) (Supp. 1971); cf. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 2(d), [1971] Ind. Acts 1914;
IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1402(d) (Supp. 1971) (in emergency situation, to preserve
trust estate, named trustee may act and will not be presumed to have accepted if
he delivers written rejection within reasonable time).
127. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 3, [1971] Ind. Acts 1915; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1403 (Supp. 1971).
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the creditor will be prejudiced thereby.128
Another area of the Trust Code which impliedly affects the rights
of third persons is that which describes the beneficiary's interest in the
trust estate as personal property, except when the trustee is required to
distribute real property from the trust estate to the beneficiary. 2" A
third person dealing with the beneficiary should have the right to rely on
this classification of the beneficiary's interest in accepting assignments
of it or in making claims against it. This is important, since the for-
malities required for transfer or asserting a lien depend upon whether
the property interest is personal or real. 3 '
These provisions of the Code encompassing the rights of third
persons with respect to the trustee and the trust estate are graphic
examples of provisions with which terms of the trust may conflict. If
only the rights of the trustee and the beneficiaries are involved, the trust
terms should prevail. If, however, the rights of third persons are adversely
affected or jeopardized, the Code provisions should control.
Code Provisions Which Establish or Uphold the
Court's Jurisdiction and Supervision Over Trusts
Numerous provisions of the Code deal with the court's supervision
of trusts and related matters. These provisions can be categorized into
seven general classifications: (1) jurisdiction and inherent equitable
powers of the courts, including the right of appeal; (2) effect of judg-
ments rendered by the courts; (3) control over the trustee, including
the right to remove; (4) procedural matters, such as pleadings, venue
and notice; (5) accounting by the trustee to the court (when required) ;
128. IND. CODE § 29-1-6-4 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-604 (1953). Since the
Trust Code applies to testamentary trusts, a question arises as to whether the Trust
Code or the Probate Code applies should this situation arise with regard to a testa-
mentary trust. The distinction between the two provisions is that the Probate Code
expressly provides that creditors of the beneficiary may object to the renunciation. Cf.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801 (no provision for creditors to object).
129. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 7(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1916; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1 4 07(c) (Supp. 1971).
130. Compare IND. CODE § 32-1-2-4 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-103 (1961):
Conveyances of lands, or of any interest therein, shall be by deed in
writing, subscribed, sealed and duly acknowledged by the grantor ...
with IND. CODE § 26-1-1-206 (1971) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-1-1206 (1964) :
[A] contract for the sale of personal property is not enforceable . .
beyond five thousand dollars . . . unless there is some writing . . . signed
by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent.
Compare IND. CODE § 34-1-45-2 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2706 (1968) (judgment
lien on real estate) with IND. CODE § 34-1-34-9 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3316
(1968) (judgment lien on chattels). See also IND. CODE § 34-1-45-1 (1971) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 2-3613 (1968) (beneficiaries' interest in real estate held in trust subject
to judgment lien).
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(6) bonding of the trustee (when required) and (7) powers of the court
when the trust instrument fails to provide otherwise. Although there
are different reasons in each of these classifications for holding that the
Code prevails in the event of conflict with the terms of the trust, one
basic reason applicable to all classifications is that the court has inherent
jurisdiction to supervise trusts.18' Under the Code, a trust is not subject
to continuing supervision by the court unless the trust instrument so
provides, 82 but the court still has jurisdiction in the event of disputes,
problems or other matters arising under the terms of the trust. The
distinction drawn is between continuing jurisdiction as it relates to
administrative accounting by the trustee and the general jurisdiction
of the courts to resolve problems arising in the creation and admin-
istration of express trusts.
The first classification encompasses those provisions dealing with
the jurisdiction and powers of the court. Except as otherwise provided
therein, the Code is not to be construed to limit the general equity powers
of the court over the administration of trusts."' Powers accorded to the
courts by the Code include the power to terminate the trust if its purposes
are either fulfilled or become illegal 4 and the power to rescind or reform
the trust for the same grounds applicable to nontrust transfers of pro-
perty." ' When the purposes of the trust are fulfilled or are impossible
to fulfill, the trustee has nothing further to do except make a final
distribution of the trust property. To prevent the court from terminating
a trust under such circumstances would be tantamount to requiring
the trustee to perform useless acts-a requirement contrary to one of
the established maxims of equity.' Since a trustee cannot fulfill a trust
that is, or has become, illegal, the court should have the power to ter-
minate a trust for illegal purposes. As to the court's power of rescission
131. The general jurisdiction of chancery to enforce trusts obviously gives
the court power to order a trustee to carry out an imperative power....
An attempt by the settlor to prevent the court from exercising control
over the trust would doubtless be void.
BOGERT, spra note 64, § 558; Premier Steel Co. v. Yandes, 139 Ind. 307, 38 N.E. 849
(1894) ; Newlin v. Newlin, 114 Ind. App. 574, 52 N.E2d 503 (1944).
132. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 2, [1971] Ind. Acts 1951; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1802 (Supp. 1971).
133. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 30, [1971] Ind. Acts 1934; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1530 (Supp. 1971).
134. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 24, [1971] Ind. Acts 1932; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1524 (Supp. 1971).
135. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 25, [1971] Ind. Acts 1932; Im. ANN. STAT §
31-1525 (Supp. 1971).
136. "There is a maxim that courts of equity will not do or require the doing of
a vain or useless thing. . . ." Cantwell v. Cantwell, 237 Ind. 168, 178, 143 N.F.2d
275, 280 (1957), appeal dismissed d- cert. denied, 356 U.S. 225 (1958).
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or reformation, the trust itself may be set aside or amended when grounds
exist for such remedies. The court has these equitable powers notwith-
standing contrary terms of the trust in situations in which it is necessary
to protect against fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake.'37
The right to appeal any decision of a court having jurisdiction of
proceedings is provided in the Code"8' and is as fundamental as the right
of an interested party to bring an action in the first instance. The trust
by its terms could not prevent such appeal.
In a different realm of basic judicial powers, the Code provides
that the court may for reasonable cause order a trustee to disclose to any
person information concerning the trust and the beneficiaries.' 89
Although one of the objectives of the Code is to preserve the confiden-
tiality of trust matters, 4 ' the trust should not be used as a device to
conceal matters when, in the opinion of the court, good cause is shown
warranting disclosure. In the case of a trust in which there is real estate
either in violation of a building code or the subject of a transaction with
the state or political subdivision thereof, the court must order disclosure
of the identity of the beneficiaries." It is apparent that this provision
of the Code is to prevent the use of a trust to conceal the identity of the
beneficiaries when violations of law or conflicts of interest may exist
with respect to trust real estate. In the case of building code violations,
concealment becomes more tempting as stricter enforcement of building
codes results in criminal and increased civil liabilities for landlords. 2
137. IV ScoTT, supra note 9, § 333. See Colbo V. Buyer, 235 Ind. 518, 134
N.E2d 45 (1956).
138. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 11, [1971] Ind. Acts 1954; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1811 (Supp. 1971).
139. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 4(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1935; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1604(a) (Supp. 1971).
140. See Ard, supra note 1, at 440.
141. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 4(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1936; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1604(b) (Supp. 1971)
142. Certain of the banks named as defendants in their capacity as trustees
under land trust agreements have moved to dismiss or for summary judg-
ment on the ground that they hold only legal title to the properties in
question and have no authority to deal with the properties beyond their
limited responsibilities as trustees .
Moreover, although the banks claim that they are not the real parties
in interest and could not, therefore, participate in the unlawful activity
alleged, the banks in many instances are the only identified sellers since
they executed the contracts as sellers, and the buyers have no way to identify
the real parties whom the banks assert have complete management and
control over the trust properties.
Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 229 (N.D. I1. 1969),
afj'd sub non. Baker v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821
(1970) ; see also Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies,
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The second classification encompasses the effect of judgments by the
court and includes several Code provisions. One such provision states
that the court's judgment on an accounting is final, conclusive and
binding upon all parties to the action who are subject to the jurisdiction
of the court."3 This provision restates prior statutory provisions.'" It
is vell established that a judgment is final and binding on those properly
before the court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter.4 ' The Code also provides that any adjudication involving the
interests of persons represented by a personal representative shall be
lawful and binding on all persons, whether notified or not, who are
of the same class as the person so represented. 46 This provision is
the same as that already in the Probate Code, and, as noted there, the
provision is based on the equitable doctrines of class actions and virtual
representation. 7 If trust terms prevail in the event of conflict with either
of these provisions, there could be an endless series of claims and suits
with respect to accountings and claims against the trustee. To permit such
multiplicity is certainly contrary to established public policy.
The third classification encompasses the court's powers over the
trustee. The Trust Code provides that the court may remove a trustee;
the comments give minimal guidelines for removal.'48 It is well estab-
66 CoLUx. L. REv. 1254 (1966); Sax & Hiestand, Slunlordwsr as a Tort, 65 McH.
L. REv. 869 (1967).
143. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 15, [1971] Ind. Acts 1947; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1715 (Supp. 1971).
144. IND. CODE §§ 30-2-1-7, -10 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-707, -10 (1969)
(repealed 1971) ; cf. UNiFoai TRUSTEES ACCOUNTING ACT § 11.
145. See A. VEsTAL, RES J DicrA/PREcLusioN chs. 1, 18 (1969).
146. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 10, [1971] Ind. Acts 1954; Ind. Ann. Stat. §
31-1810 (Supp. 1971).
147. Its purpose is to enable the court to make a final decree against
absentees and incompetent persons, settling forever their property rights
in estate matters where their rights are in a class with others having
the same rights and are represented in the matter. Their interest, of course,
must be the same as a party having a predominent interest. It does not
however restrict the doctrine of class suits and virtual representation,
solely to the situation covered by this section.
Comment to InD. CODE § 29-1-1-20(d) (1971) ; IND. A.NN. STAT. § 6-120(d) (1953).
148. This subsection follows RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 107 (1959).
Reasons given in the Restatement for removing a trustee include incapacity,
a serious breach of trust, refusal to give bond as required, refusal to account,
commission of a crime, general unfitness, inattention to matters of admin-
istration, partiality between beneficiaries, or unreasonable refusal to cooperate
with the co-trustees.
Comment to Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 29(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1934; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1529(a) (Supp. 1971); cf. IND. CODE § 30-1-9-12 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §
56-619 (1961) (repealed 1971) :
Trustees having violated or attempted to violate any express trust, or
becoming insolvent, or of whose solvency or that of their sureties there is
reasonable doubt, or for other cause in the discretion of a court having
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lished that good cause must be shown and that the court cannot act
arbitrarily.'49 Even without statutory authority and irrespective of the
trust it has been held that a court has the power to remove a trustee
for cause. 5 ' The trust may provide for a lesser degree of care by the
trustee in the administration of the trust than would be required without
such provision,'' but the trust terms cannot entirely prevent the court
from exercising its power of removal.' 52
The same rationale can be applied to the Code provision which
authorizes the court for good cause to appoint a temporary trustee.'58
Such authority is essential if there is to be a trustee to administer the
trust in the event of the incapacity or death of a trustee, before a suc-
cessor can be appointed.' This power is supplemental to the court's
power to remove a trustee since it could be invoked pending an action
for removal.
jurisdiction, may, on petition of any person interested, after hearing, be
removed by such court, and all vacancies in express trusteeships may be
filled by such court.
149. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 202 Ind. 641, 177 N.E. 454 (1931); Ex
parte Kilgore, 120 Ind. 94, 22 N.E. 104 (1889) ; Wilson v. Edmonds, 78 Ind. App. 501,
136 N.E. 48 (1922).
A court which has supervision over the administration of trusts has
power to remove a trustee for proper cause. Unless the grounds for removal
are stated in a statute, and unless the grounds so stated are exclusive, the
matter is one for the exercise of a sound discretion by the court. If the
court of first instance orders the removal of a trustee without sufficient
reason, or refuses to remove a trustee when grounds for removal are such
that the refusal to remove him is an abuse of discretion by the court, the
appellate court will reverse its action. The question in each case is whether
the circumstances are such that the continuance of the trustee in office
would be detrimental to the trust. Certain circumstances are clearly and
necessarily a ground for removal; others may or may not be, depending
on the whole situation.
II ScoTT, supra note 9, § 107 at 840-41 (footnotes omitted).
150. Mazelin v. Rouyer, 8 Ind. App. 27, 35 N.E. 303 (1893).
151. The trust instrument may contain a clause purporting to free the
trustee from liability for certain described types of conduct or to limit
his responsibility to the maintenance of certain standards. Thus, an attempt
may be made to excuse him from liability for acts done in good faith but
under a mistake; or the document may state that he shall be liable only for
breaches of trust intentionally committed by him. These clauses are called
immunity or exculpatory clauses, because they relieve the trustee from
duties and liabilities which would otherwise rest upon him.
BOGERT supra note 64, § 542, at 458-59.
152. Id., § 519, at 327.
153. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 4, § 29(d) [1971] Ind. Acts 1934; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1529(d) (Supp. 1971).
154. IND. CODE § 30-1-9-10 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-617 (1961) (repealed
1971) provided that on the death of a sole trustee of an express trust, the trust vested
in the court having jurisdiction thereof and that such court should forthwith appoint
a successor trustee. Without this provision, the title to the trust property probably
vests in the trustee's executor or administrator until a successor or temporary trustee
is appointed. See Silvers v. Canary, 114 Ind. 129, 16 N.E. 166 (1888).
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The power of the court to appoint a successor trustee is also pro-
vided in the Code."' It can be exercised in situations in which the trust
does not provide for a method of appointing a successor. When it is
evident that it was the intent of the settlor to create a trust irrespective
of the identity of the trustee, the trust will not fail for want of a
trustee."5 6 In order to preserve the trust, the court must, therefore,
have power to appoint a trustee regardless of the trust's terms, which
might provide, for example, that the court is to have no control or
jurisdiction over the trust. If it is clear, however, from the terms of the
trust that the settlor intended that only the named trustee could act, the
trust will fail if that trustee dies, resigns or refuses to serve."'
In this same classification of control over the trustee, the Code
provides which facts are to be considered, by a court in determining
whether a defaulting trustee should be allowed any fee or a reduced
fee. ' As noted previously, this discretionary power of the court over
the fees of a trustee is essential if the trustee's duty of loyalty is to be
enforced effectively. 9 The relevant facts are a matter for the court to
determine in its discretion. The terms of the trust form merely a part
of the overall consideration and are not controlling, since these terms
should not be able to direct the court as to how and for what reasons it
should exercise its discretion.
The fourth classification embodies those Code provisions which set
forth the procedures to be followed when the court's jurisdiction is
invoked. Among these procedural matters is the general provision that,
except as otherwise provided in the Code, the Indiana Rules of Procedure
155. Pub. L. No. 416, ci. 4, § 29(c), [19711 Ind. Acts 1934; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1529(c) (Supp. 1971).
156. Rice v. Fletcher Say. & Trust Co., 215 Ind. 698, 22 N.E.2d 809 (1939); II
ScoTt, mepra note 64, § 101.
157. The reason why a trust does not fail for want of a trustee is that
to permit it to fail for this reason would be contrary to the intention of the
settlor in creating the trust. The settlor is primarily interested in the
disposition of the beneficial interest in the property, and the matter of its
administration is a subsidiary consideration. . . . There are, however,
rare cases in which it appears that the settlor intended the trust to continue
only so long as the person designated by him as trustee should continue as
trustee. It may be expressly so provided by the terms of the trust, or it
may appear that the purposes of the trust cannot be carried out unless the
person named by the settlor as trustee continues to act. In such a case the
the trust will fail if the trustee dies or resigns or is removed or otherwise
ceases to be trustee.
Id., § 101.1, at 819-20; see Hadley v. Hadley, 147 Ind. 423, 46 N.E. 823 (1897).
158. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 17(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1947; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1717(b) (Supp. 1971).
159. See note 63 mipra & text accompanying.
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apply. 6 ' Other provisions of the Code cover special matters, including
the form of pleadings to initiate an action,' persons to whom and
manner in which notice must be given,'62 conditions under which a
copy of the trust instrument must be filed as part of the proceedings,'63
extent of the right to change venue" and rules covering responsive
pleadings when a verified statement of accounts is filed with the court.' 2
The rules of procedure governing the court's handling of cases presented
and the subject matter of the controversy (whether it is a trust, a con-
tract or a similar instrument) cannot be directed by the instrument's
terms. This power of rule making is inherent either in the courts or in
the legislative branch. 6
Closely related to the procedural provisions of the Code are the
provisions in the fifth classification which include the requirements for
filing written statements of account with the court. If the settlor pro-
vides that the court is to have continuing jurisdiction to supervise the
administration of the trust,'67 the trustee is required to file with the
court a verified written statement of accounts 68 containing specified
information. 9 If the settlor voluntarily invokes such continuing juris-
diction, he should not be able to curtail or limit the effectiveness of
the court's supervision by providing that the trustee need not account
to the court or need not furnish the information required by the Code.' 0
160. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 13, [1971] Ind. Acts 1955; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1813 (Supp. 1971)
161. Pub L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 5, [1971] Ind. Acts 1952; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1805 (Supp. 1971).
162. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 6, [1971] Ind. Acts 1952; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1806 (Supp. 1971).
163. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 7, [1971] Ind. Acts 1953; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1807 (Supp. 1971).
164. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 3(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1951; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1 803(c) (Supp. 1971).
165. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, §§ 14(b)-(d), [1971] Ind. Acts 1946-47; IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 31-1714(b)-(d) (Supp. 1971).
166. In Indiana, the rule making power has been regarded as neither exclusivelyjudicial nor exclusively legislative. In the event of conflict, the rules promulgated
by the court prevail. IND. CODE § 34-5-2-1 (1971); Im. ANN. STAT. § 2-4718 (1968);
Note, The Court v. The Legislature: Rule Making Power in Indiana, 36 IND. L.J. 87
(1960).
167. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 2, [1971] Ind. Acts 1951; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1802 (Supp. 1971).
168. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 12(d), [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1712(d) (Supp. 1971).
169. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 13, [1971] Ind. Acts 1945; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1713 (Supp. 1971).
170. Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, 101 N.E. 493 (1912), involved a
testamentary trust for benevolent purposes. Although the settlor had dispensed with
the requirement of accounting, the court held that the trust terms would have to
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To permit otherwise would be to thrust the burden and responsibility
of continuous supervision on the court but to withhold the irformatiort
necessary for effective supervision.
The sixth classification encompasses provisions of the Code by which
the trustee may be required by the court to provide a bond to secure
his performance. Unless the trust provides otherwise, no bond need be
provided by a trustee. 1 - If, however, the court has continuing super-
vision of the trust, the court may, sua sponte, require the trustee to
furnish bond.' Inasmuch as the Code provides that only the settlor may
direct that the administration of the trust be under the continuing supre-
vision of the court, it would seem strange if, in the same instrument, he
could delete the court's statutory option to require a bond. To prevent
the court from exercising its option would detract from the court's
power to supervise the trust effectively. As Ex parte Kilgore,"" the
leading Indiana case in the area, states:
If [the testator] appoints a trustee and vests him with
power to execute the trust without the aid or appointment
of the court, his express directions exempting the trustee from
giving bond can not be disregarded ...
* '* *If, however, it be the clearly expressed purpose
of the author of the trust that the trustee should not be required
to execute a bond, it is not within the power of the court to
set aside an unequivocal provision. . . , except its aid or juris-
diction is invoked in the course of a matter or proceeding in
which the statute requires the filing of a bond.
Under the rationale of Kilgore, when the aid of the court is invoked in
the administration of the trust, the court can require a bond irrespective
of the terms of the trust. This is analogous to the supervising court's
power to require written statements of account to be filed with the court.
The court's ability to require bond does not render meaningless the
provision dispensing with bond unless the trust provides otherwise. That
provision still enables a trustee to qualify and serve without bond as
trustee of a court-supervised trust unless the court exercises its option.
"give way to the statute" requiring accounting. See also BoGET, supra note 64, §
973, at 249-50.
171. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 8(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1953; InD. ANN. STAT. §
31-1808(a) (Supp. 1971).
172. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 8(b), [1971] Ind. Acts 1953; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1808(b) (Supp. 1971); cf. IND. CODE §§ 28-2-7-1, 2 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
18-1114, 1115 (1964).
173. 120 Ind. 94, 22 N.E. 104 (1889).
174. Id. at 96-97, 22 N.E. at 105.
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Even if the trust is not under a court's continuing supervision, the
court may, upon petition by an interested party, direct the trustee to
provide a bond if it seems necessary to the court to protect the interest
of any beneficiary."75 This seems to emanate from the court's inherent
jurisdiction,'76 now embodied in statute, 7' to determine matters and
resolve disputes involving trusts. This power of the court assures pro-
tection of the beneficiary's interest in the trust. To permit a trust to
provide otherwise could jeopardize the trust estate in situations, among
others, in which the solvency of the trustee is questionable.
If bond is required, the court determines the amount, term and
surety unless otherwise specified.' This provision supplements the Code
provisions permitting the court to require bond of a trustee. Also supple-
mental to these provisions is the Code section concerning procedural
and substantive matters when suit is brought to collect on the bond.'79
Again, this provision is necessary in order to protect the trust property
and the interests of the beneficiaries.
The seventh classification includes provisions which authorize the
court to act in relation to the trust except when the trust, either directly
or indirectly, provides otherwise. Although these Code provisions are
not prefaced by the clause, "unless the terms of the trust provide other-
wise," they are not applicable unless the trust contains certain terms or
unless certain extrinsic factors are present. For example, the Code
provides that the court may modify the terms of the trust to give the
settlor the power to revoke or modify the trust, if he intended to reserve
the power, believed that he had reserved it and the power was omitted
by mistake. 8 This provision would only be pertinent if the settlor said
nothing in the trust concerning his right to revoke. If the settlor also met
the extrinsic requirements of intent, belief and mistake, the court could
modify the trust to provide a right to revoke regardless of conflicting
trust terms. Conflicting terms exist if the trust provides that the court
has no right to modify its terms. The settlor who fully intended to reserve
175. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 8(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1953; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1808(c) (Supp. 1971).
176. Ex parte Kilgore, 120 Ind. 94, 22 N.E. 104 (1889); accord, State ex rel.
Dair v. Roudebush, 114 Ind. 347, 16 N.E. 636 (1888).
177. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 30, ch. 6, § 1, [1971] Ind. Acts 1934, 1951; Im.
ANN. STAT. § 31-1530, -1801 (Supp. 1971).
178. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 8(e), [1971] Ind. Acts 1953; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1808(e) (Supp. 1971).
179. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 9, [1971] Ind. Acts 1954; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1809 (Supp. 1971).
180. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 28, [1971] Ind. Acts 1933; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1528 (Supp. 1971).
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the power to revoke would be stymied by the terms of the trust unless the
Code provisions prevail.' 8'
A similar provision in the Code is that which permits the court to
authorize the trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust if, owing to
circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him, com-
pliance would defeat or substantially impair the purposes of the trust.'82
The trust, for example, could provide for limitations on the types of
investments. This would not result in a conflict with the Code provision.
If the trust, however, provided that the trustee was not to deviate, what-
ever the changed conditions, the conflict would exist. Under these cir-
cumstances, if the beneficial purpose of the trust is not to be defeated or
substantially impaired, the Code provision authorizing deviation should
prevail. This result is in keeping with case law prior to the Code. 8 '
The long established doctrine of cy pres has been codified in the
Trust Code. 84 This provision applies only when the settlor has mani-
fested a general charitable intent and the specific charitable purpose
expressed in the trust becomes impossible, impractical or illegal. The
effect of the cy pres provision differs from the provision permitting a
court to authorize deviation in that cy pres affects the purpose of the trust
while deviation affects administration of the trust.'85 Conflict between
the cy pres provision in the Code and the terms of the trust is not
possible. If the general charitable intent is not expressed or if the settlor
makes it clear that the trust shall fail if the specific charitable purpose
cannot be carried out, the trust fails, and the cy pres provision is not
applicable to save it.
The forgoing seven areas encompass the aspects of the court's juris-
diction and powers over the administration of trusts which are within
the scope of the Code. In some instances the jurisdiction or power is
invoked in a proceeding brought by an adverse party. In others the trustee
may be the moving party and in still others the court may take action
181. See Colbo v. Buyer, 235 Ind. 518, 134 N.E2d 45 (1956); cf. Lederman v.
Lisinsky, 112 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
182. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 26, [1971] Ind. Acts 1932; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1526 (Supp. 1971).
183. Foust v. William E. English Foundation, 118 Ind. App. 484, 80 N.E.2d 303
(1948). II ScoTT, supra note 9, § 167, at 1270; 24 INn. L.J. 464 (1949).
184. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3 § 27, [1971] Ind. Acts 1933; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1527 (Supp. 1971) ; see Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Say. Co., 223 Ind. 317, 60 N.E.2d
281 (1944).
That doctrine [equitable deviation] is frequently confused with another
equitable doctrine, cy pres, by which courts under somewhat similar cir-
cumstances justify departure from directions contained in trust instruments.
24 IND. L. J. 464, 465 (1949).
185. IV Scott, supra note 9, § 399, at 3086; 24 IND. L.J. 464, 465 (1949).
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on its own motion. In some situations the jurisdiction arises by the terms
of the trust itself. In any event, once jurisdiction is invoked, the powers
of the court as provided in the Code should prevail in the event of
conflict with the terms of the trust.
CODE PROVISIONS OVER WHICH TERMS OF THE TRUST
SHOULD PREVAIL IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT
As a result of the analysis pursued in this article, provisions of the
Code have been identified which should prevail in the event of conflict
with terms of a trust. The remaining provisions of the Code should yield
to the terms of the trust in the event of conflict. As noted previously,
this is based on the policy expressed in chapter 1, § 3 of the Code to the
effect that the terms of the trust control unless the rules of law clearly
prohibit or restrict them. A few observations will suffice to identify
areas in which the terms of the trust should prevail.
Trust terms which set forth the duties and liabilities of the trustee
involve areas upon which the settlor and trustee should be permitted to
agree in the case of an inter vivos trust and which the settlor should be
able to control in the case of a testamentary trust. So long as these terms
do not conflict with Code provisions heretofore identified as necessary
for the preservation of the trust for the settlor's purposes, these trust
terms should prevail. For example, one Code provision states that the
duties of the trustee may not be enlarged without the consent of the
trustee."' Although it is difficult to conceive of a trustee agreeing to
a trust, the instrument could provide otherwise. Only the consenting
trustee would be affected. For another example, the settlor and trustee
should be permitted to determine the ultimate liability for injury suf-
fered by a third party irrespective of Code provisions. 8 ' Still another
example arises when the trust provides that the trustee be discharged
within a specified time from liability on all matters set forth in the
account furnished to beneficiaries. The trust could provide that such dis-
charge be in a manner other than by a writing signed by the beneficiary. 8
One provision of the Code which appears at first glance to be one
over which the terms of the trust should not prevail is that establishing a
special statute of limitations of three years applicable to claims against
186. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 1(c), [1971] Ind. Acts 1918; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1501 (c) (Supp. 1971)
187. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 3, § 10(b) [1971] Ind. Acts 1925; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1510(b) (Supp. 1971).
188. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 5, § 14(a), [1971] Ind. Acts 1946; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1714(a) (Supp. 1971).
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a trustee on his final account."' 9 A trust could provide either a longer
or shorter period, and a conflict with the Code would exist. If the
shorter period is reasonable, there is ample precedent in contract cases
for upholding the shorter period, absent a statute voiding such contract
provisions."' ° With respect to extending the period within which to
assert claims, it is far from clear whether the extension would be upheld
by the courts."' The theory of waiver of the statutory limitation by the
terms of the trust is somewhat tenuous, since waiver is generally required
of the party in whom the cause of action resides-i.e., in the case of a
trust, the beneficiary who is not a signatory of the trust. Few cases deal
with trust situations, although analogous situations are presented in
claims by beneficiaries of life insurance policies."9 2 It is beyond the
scope of this article to discuss this problem in the detail and depth
required.
With respect to the terms of the trust which control the disposition
of trust property, the settlor's intent should prevail. For example, if a
beneficiary disclaims, the settlors should be able to designate who takes
the property rather than having the trust property distributed pursuant
to the Code. 9'
The foregoing are a few examples of Code provisions over which
the terms of the trust should prevail in the case of conflict. As noted
throughout, the result in the case of a conflict may well be determined
on the basis of whose interest is to be protected-the settlor, the trustee,
the beneficiaries, the public or third parties.
CONCLUSION
While an attempt has been made to identify provisions of the Code
which will prevail in the event of conflict with terms of the trust, the
more important purpose of this article is to suggest guidelines and criteria
both for making judgments when such conflict occurs and for making
decisions in the drafting of trusts. It does not seem likely that many
189. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 6, § 12, [1971] Ind. Acts 1955; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1812 (Supp. 1971).
190. Hooser v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 177 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Ind. 1959); see
Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1197 (1966).
191. National Sur. Co. v. American Cement Tile Mfg. Co., 226 Ala. 373, 147
So. 158 (1933); Wright v. Gardner, 98 Ky. 454, 33 S.W. 622 (1895). The period.
prescribed by statute in both cases was deemed a matter of public policy, and terms.
of the contract enlarging the period were void.
192. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586
(1947); Caywood v. The Supreme Lodge, Knights & Ladies of Honor, 171 Ind. 410,
86 N.E. 482 (1908).
193. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 2, § 4, [19711 Ind. Acts 1915; IND. ANN. STAT. §
31-1404 (Supp. 1971).
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conflicts will arise, since the Code codifies many trust practices and
procedures which practicing lawyers and trust officers have been
following for years. It is, however, the isolated instance of conflict which
can cause an embarrassing situation for the unwary draftsman.
The Indiana Trust Code is landmark legislation in the field of
trust law. Other states contemplating enactment of a comprehensive
trust code should look to the Indiana Code, as well as to the less com-
prehensive codes in Texas'" and Louisiana.'95 It should be born in mind
that practicing lawyers and trust officers were instrumental in the draft-
ing of the Code. The emphasis was on a workable code for day-to-day
trust practice.
With respect to the general provision of the Code which is the sub-
ject of this article, Indiana could have been more precise. Since the
purpose of any codification is to make the law more readily ascertain-
able and certain in its application, this provision of the Trust Code inter-
jects an uncertainty which is not warranted. It appears that the impact
of this provision on the other provisions of the Code was not fully
1ecognized when it was inserted in the Code as a general "catch-all"
provision. Perhaps one of the first amendments to the Code should
eliminate much of this uncertainty. Admittedly this would render the
Code less flexible, but the uncertainty engendered by this provision seems
too exorbitant a price to pay for flexibility. When the first disputes
arise this will become readily apparent. Amendments could identify
specific provisions of the Code or at least amplify what is meant by "the
rules of law" which "clearly prohibit or restrict the article which the
terms of the trust purport to authorize."
194. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 7425b-1 et seq. (1960).
195. LA. RiV. STAT. § 9:1721 et seq. (1965).
